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FAMILY LAW: PARENT AND CHILD
by
Ellen K. Solender*
I. INTRODUCTION: CHANGES IN THE FAMILY CODE
HE 71st Texas Legislature enacted numerous changes in The Texas
Family Code, Title 2, Parent and Child.' The Texas Legislature has
enacted changes in every regular session as well as in many special
sessions since the original passage of Title 2 in 1973. It is to be expected that
this habit will continue, since the Family Code is quite complex and affects
the lives of many legislators as well as their constituents.
A number of the changes were to conform the Code to a change in atti-
tude towards children born out of wedlock.2 From September 1, 1989, chil-
dren will not be deemed legitimate or illegitimate, but will instead merely be
children having unknown fathers, presumed biological fathers, fathers adju-
dicated as biological fathers, or adoptive fathers.3 Husbands are presumed
biological fathers.4
While all chapters of Title 2 underwent some changes, two areas under-
went major changes; the rules concerning the presumption of custody and
the requirements for support and its enforcement. In the past, a parent has
had the benefit of the presumption that it is in the best interest of the child
that the parent be named mananaging conservator even though the parent
had voluntarily relinquished the child to some other person for a period of
time.5 The legislature has now specified that after a year that other person
can file suit to be named managing conservator, and if it is found that it
would be in the best interest of the child to maintain this relationship, that
other person may be named managing conservator.6
The statute also creates the rebuttable presumption that it is in the best
interest of the child for both parents to have a high degree of access to the
child.7 A decree that names a parent as the possessory conservator s must
* A.B., Oberlin College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Professor of Law, South-
ern Methodist University.
1. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.01 - 36.02 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
2. See, eg., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ I1.03(a)(7), 13.01(a), 15.023 (Vernon Supp.
1990).
3. Id. § 11.01(3) (definition of "parent"). Unknown fathers cannot have parental rights
or responsibilities and are only mentioned in connection with notice. Id. § 11.09(a)(8), (d).
4. Id. § 12.02(a)(1) (presumption of paternity).
5. cf. Neely v. Neely, 698 S.W.2d 758 (Trex. App.-Austin 1985, No Writ).
6. Id. § 14.01(b)(2).
7. Id. § 14.033(k).
8. Id. § 14.032.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
contain and follow the detailed guidelines of the standard order as estab-
lished by the legislature,9 unless the parties have entered into a written
agreement that has been approved by the court. 10 The parties may, how-
ever, vary the terms of a standard order at any time, provided there is mu-
tual agreement. Failing mutual agreement, the terms revert to the standard
order. I
The guidelines have no enforcement provisions, but since they will be
written specifically, they should be enforcable through contempt.12 This, of
course, will encourage the managing conservator to release the child to the
possessory conservator when it is mandated by the standard order. If the
possessory conservator, however, gives written notice to the managing con-
servator that it will not be possible to pick up the child as scheduled, there is
nothing the managing conservator can do.13 If the possessory conservator
without notice repeatedly fails to appear to pick up the child, this may be
considered a factor for modification of the order.14 It would seem that there
should be some afirmative requirement for the exercise of the right to pos-
session and that the right would lapse if there had been a failure to exercise it
for a certain number of times, with or without notice to the managing
conservator.
A couple may have a disabled child and not decide to divorce until after
the child has become eighteen. The previous interpretation of the statute
held that a court under those circumstances was without jurisdiction to or-
der child support.' 5 The Family Code has now been changed to permit
courts to order either or both parents to support a disabled child even after
the child becomes eighteen, providing it is a pre-existing disability.16 The
right is for parents and their adult children only and cannot be brought by or
assigned to any agency.' 7
The child support guidelines have been incorporated into the text of the
Family Code.18 There are few substantive changes from the guidelines or-
dered by the Texas Supreme Court in 1987.19 The most important is that
the guidelines are no longer intended to merely guide the courts in establish-
ing child support amounts but are rebuttably presumed to be in the best
9. Id. § 14.033 (standard possession order).
10. Id. § 14.06 (agreements concerning conservatorship).
11. Id § 14.033(b).
12. Id. §§ 14.312(b), 14.50.
13. Id. § 14.033(g)(5).
14. Id.
15. Red v. Red, 552 S.W.2d 90, 94-95 (Tex. 1977).
16. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051 (Vernon Supp. 1990). This will solve the problem
for custodial parents of adult children in cases such as In re Marriage of Burrell, 747 S.W.2d
479 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied) and Adkins v. Adkins 743 S.W.2d 745 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1987, writ denied). See Solender, Parent and Child, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 43 SW. L.J. 37, 46, 47 (1989).
17. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(c) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
18. Id. §§ 14.052-.057.
19. Order of the Supreme Court of Texas (eff. Feb. 4, 1987). 50 Tex. Bar J. 384 (April
1987) This order is now essentially incorporated in TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.055 (Vernon
Supp. 1990) See infra notes 149-150.
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interest of the child.20 The amounts are no longer stated as a range, but are
a definite percent of the obligor's net resources. 21 It has been made clear
that when modifying an existing support order, the court should not auto-
matically lower it because of an obligor's support obligation to a later born
child or increase it because the obligor has been voluntarily paying in excess
of the required amount.22 Also, the net resources or needs of a second
spouse of either the obligor or obligee are not to be included in the calcula-
tions of the net resources of the obligor or obligee.
23
A new section has been added to the Family Code pertaining to health
insurance.24 The court can order either the obligor or the obligee to main-
tain health insurance for the benefit of the child. Which party is required to
maintain insurance will depend on who has access to the better insurance
plan, and if no plans are available at a reasonable cost, the court may dis-
pense with the obligation altogether.
To further facilitate determining the whereabouts of the parties, the
driver's license numbers of the parties must be included in the decree. 25 The
decree must also contain warnings as to what might happen should there be
a failure to follow the orders contained in the decree. 26 Williams v. Green 
27
has been overruled by the legislature and as a result the Child Support En-
forcement Division of the Office of the Attorney General may now seek to
modify as well as establish child support orders.28 This was an odd decision
and placed Texas out of compliance with the federal Family Support Act of
1988.29
The parent-child relationship may be terminated if the parent has been
found criminally responsible for the death or serious injury of another of the
parent's children, 30 or has had a prior parent-child relationship terminated
because of endangering the child.31 The termination must also be in the best
interest of the child.32 This means that if a parent has injured only one of
the parent's two children, the parent-child relationship with the uninjured
child may also be terminated if it is found to be in that child's best interest.
The information that adoptive parents are entitled to receive before they
adopt a child has been increased.33 They are now entitled to receive a full
report, not just a summary of the background of the child to be adopted,
20. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.055(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
21. Id. § 14.055(b).
22. Id. § 14.056(b).
23. Id. § 14.056(c).
24. Id. § 14.061.
25. Id. § 11.155. In addition, this section requires the parties to inform the clerk of the
court of the their current addresses and telephone numbers as well as those of their current
employers and if any of this information changes, to inform the clerk within ten days. Id.
26. Id. § 11.155(d).
27. 746 S.W.2d 940 (rex. App.-Austin 1988, writ denied).
28. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
29. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988).
30. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(1)(L) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
31. Id. § 15.02(1)XM).
32. Id. § 15.02(2).
33. Id. § 16.032(a), (e)(1),(8-10).
1990]
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and to receive it as soon as practicable.34 This duty, which applies not only
to the Texas Department of Human Services, but to all authorized agencies
and persons placing children for adoption, includes informing the prospec-
tive adoptive parents of their right to examine the records and information
relating to the history of the child.35
The above represents a sampling of the many changes enacted by the sev-
enty-first legislative sessions during 1989. The State Bar Family Law Sec-
tion Reports sets out in detail the statutory changes along with some
legislative history.36
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. Child Abuse
If the Texas Department of Human Services receives reports of child
abuse and fails to act to protect the child, and as a result, the child is perma-
nently injured, the child may not bring an action alleging violation of rights
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.37 Further-
more, no statutory civil rights action may be fled. 38 The state has no consti-
tutional duty to protect one citizen from the private actions of another
citizen. This was the holding in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department
of Social Services.39 The Court did go on to say that while there is no con-
stitutional duty, it is possible for states to create other methods for holding
state agencies accountable, including permitting actions in tort.40
B. Statutes Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship
The Court in Dellmuth v. Muth41 held that unless the language of an Act
evinces a clear intention to abrogate a State's immunity from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment,42 there can be no action for damages against the
State.43 The Court held that the Assistance for Education of All Handi-
capped Children Act" did not contain such specific language and therefore,
a father who had to pay for his child's private school education during the
time the school system failed to follow the Act could not recover his tuition
expenses.45
34. Id. § 16.032(f).
35. Id. § 16.032(n).
36. Vol. 89-1 Special Legislation Issue - Part I and Vol. 89-2 Legislation Edition, Part II.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
39. 109 S. Ct. 998, 1003, 103 L. Ed. 2d 249, 258-59 (1989).
40. Id. at 1007. See Hodorowski v. Ray, 844 F.2d 1210, 1217 (5th Cir. 1988) (child wel-
fare workers have only a qualified immunity when they err in removing a child from its home
because of alleged child abuse). But see Del A. v. Edwards, 855 F.2d 1148, 1153-54 (5th Cir.
1988) (child welfare workers can lose their qualified immunity by failing to follow the clear
mandate of a statute).
41. 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2401, 105 L. Ed. 2d 181, 189 (1989).
42. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XI.
43. 109 S. Ct. at 2402, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 190.
44. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-20 (1982).
45. 109 S. Ct. at 2402, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 190-91.
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In Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield46 the Court held that
Indian Child Welfare Act4 7 limits parents' right to determine the domicile of
their child.48 The Court found that Congress' concern over the placement of
indian children in non-indian homes mandated a uniform federal definition
of domicile.49 The Court held that under the Act, the domicile of newborn
indian children, regardless of their actual place of birth, is that of their par-
ents when their parents are domiciled on a reservation.50 In this situation
the Act prevents a state court from having jurisdiction to enter a decree of
adoption, despite the fact that the mother has left the reservation to give
birth to her children and has also voluntarily surrendered them to a non-
indian couple for adoption.51 Congress did not intend that by manipulating
the definition of domicile, individual indian parents would be able to defeat
the purposes of the Act.52
C. Paternity
In Michael H. v. Gerald D. 53 the Court was asked to hold that in light of
the ability to determine paternity, a conclusive presumption that a husband
is the father of the child is a violation of the Due Process Clause.54 A plural-
ity of the Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, held that a state
may allow a married couple to retain a child conceived within and born into
their marriage by establishing an irrebuttable presumption that it is their
child because this type of question is one of legislative policy and not consti-
tutional law.55 Scalia based his decision on historical tradition.5 6 Although
the wife knew that her husband was not the biological father, she would not
join in a suit by the biological father to establish that fact. The biological
father, the child, and the married mother had lived together for a period of
time with the biological father conducting himself as the child's father.
Justices Brennan and White in their dissents emphasised that the result in
this case was based on a plurality of the Court, not a majority.5 7 They
found, under the facts of this, case, when the biological father seeking the
right to visit his child had actual contact with the child for a significant
period of time, he had a liberty interest in continuing that relationship; thus,
46. 109 S. Ct. 1597, 104 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1989).
47. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1982).
48. 109 S. Ct. at 1609-10. This is also a limitation on the powers of Texas Indian parents,
despite Section 12.04(1) of the Texas Family Code which states, among other things, that
parents have the right, privilege, duty and power... "to establish the legal domicile of the
child." Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.04(1) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
49. 109 S. Ct. at 1607, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 45.
50. 109 S. CL at 1608, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 46.
51. 109 S. Ct. at 1610-11, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 49.
52. 109 S. Ct. at 1609, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 47-48.
53. 109 S. Ct. 2333, 105 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1989).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
55. 109 S. Ct. at 2345, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 110.
56. 109 S. Ct. at 2343.44, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 108.
57. 109 S. CL at 2349, 2360, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 114, 128, Justice Stevens concurred in thejudgment because he believed California law did provide the father with an opportunity to be
heard on his right to visit. 109 S. CL at 2347, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 112.
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a refusal of a hearing on the matter was a denial of due process.58
The Texas Family Code provides that a father is presumed to be the bio-
logical father if the child was born during his marriage to the child's
mother.59 This presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evi-
dence.60 Either party to the marriage may deny the paternity of a child born
during the marriage;61 however, a suit to establish paternity by a non-marital
partner may be brought only when a child has no presumed father.62 Thus,
a fact pattern similar to Michael H. may occur in Texas. In that event the
court could deny the biological father standing, since under the Texas stat-
ute the child would have a presumed father (the husband), and therefore,
there could be no suit to establish the parent-child relationship.63 The bio-
logical father despite the result in Michael H. may have a constitutional right
to a hearing since that right appears to be favored by a majority of the cur-
rent United States Supreme Court justices.
III. STATUS
A. Education for Handicapped Children
Congress passed the assistance for Education of All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act" in order to assure that all children, including handicapped chil-
dren, would receive an appropriate education.65 In Daniel R.R. v. State
Board of Education 66 the court held that the case was not moot, although it
had been more than two years since the specific matter in controversy had
arisen. 67 The parents of Daniel had filed this suit because the individualized
educational treatment plan (IEP) had been changed from placing Daniel in a
regular classroom to a special classroom. The court noted that because of
the length of time it takes to review each year's TEP, a finding of mootness
would preclude any real review of the controversy. 68 The court then went
over the facts and the requirements of the Act in great detail and affirmed
the trial court's finding in favor of the school district.69 The court pointed
out that the school officials hold each child equally deserving of a share of
the school's limited resources, but that there are often a large variety of com-
peting needs and in this case the balance tipped in favor of removing Daniel
from the pre-kindergarten class.70
58. 109 S. Ct. at 2349, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 114.
59. Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.02 (a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
60. Id. § 12.02(b).
61. Id. § 12.06.
62. Id. § 13.01.
63. Cf. Espree v. Guillory, 753 S.W. 2d 722,724 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1988, no
writ) (after the divorce the biological father was denied visitation).
64. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-20 (1982).
65. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203 (1982) in which the Court held that
'appropriate" means that the child will benefit educationally.
66. 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989).
67. Id. at 1041.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1052.
70. In another case under the Act, the court reversed the summary judgment of the trial
court holding that while attorney's fees were recoverable based on a settlement prior to a
[Vol. 44
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B. Wrongful Death and Intestacy
In Garza v. Maverick Market InC71 the court held that an illegitimate
child could recover under the Texas Wrongful Death Act72 for the death of
his father if there is clear and convincing evidence that the deceased was his
father."3 The court held that it is not necessary to comply with other bodies
of law in order to recover under the Wrongful Death Act.74 The problem in
the case at issue was that the father, who had not married the mother, died
before the child was born so he could not have complied with the paternity
provisions in the Texas Family Code7" or the Probate Code. 76
Henson v. Jarmon77 was a contest to determine intestate succession in
which the jury found that the decedent had two illegitimate daughters. The
father had died before the Probate Code had been amended to include the
provision that a child could inherit from her father by showing she was his
biological child.78 The court, relying on Reed v. Campbell,79 held that since
the daughters had intervened before the estate had been distributed, it would
be a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment s° to deny
these daughters their claim.81
In Smith ex reL Sisk v. Bowen 8 2 the court came to a similar conclusion,
although the problem was with the Family Code rather than the Probate
Code. The Family Code at the time of the father's death had a one year
statute of limitations for the determination of paternity.8 3 The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that provision unconstitutional,8 4 and consequently the court
in Bowen held that with the proper statute of limitations Texas would have
found the child eligible to inherit under its intestacy laws.85 The child,
therefore, was entitled to receive social security survivor's benefits.86
In another social security case, the court held that there was no legal basis
for rejecting an illegitimate child's claim after a ruling by a Texas state court
hearing, there were genuine issues of fact as to the timing of the settlement and the amount of
the fees. Shelby C. ex. rel. Shelbie C. v. Venus Indep. School Dist., 878 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.
1989).
71. 768 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1989).
72. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.001-.011 (Vernon 1986).
73. 768 S.W.2d at 276.
74. Id. at 275.
75. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 13.01-13.09, 13.21-24 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
76. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
77. 758 S.W. 2d 368 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, no writ).
78. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
79. 476 U.S. 852 (1986). In Reed the Supreme Court held that since the estate had not
been probated at the time of the revision of the law, the interest in not discriminating against
illegitimates should control. Id. at 86.
80. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV § 1.
81. 758 S.W.2d at 371.
82. 862 F.2d 1165, 1167-68 (5th Cir. 1989).
83. Id. at 1167.
84. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 101 (1982). The current limitation in Texas is "on
or before the second anniversary of the day the child becomes an adult." Tax. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 13.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
85. 862 F.2d at 1167-68.
86. 42 U.S.C. 416(h)(2)(A) (1988).
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establishing the child's paternity. 7 However, in another social security case
the court held that a birth certificate naming the deceased wage earner as the
claimant's father is insufficient proof of paternity absent some proof that the
deceased had authorized the use of his name.88
C Paternity,
In Attorney General of Texas v. Ridge89 the court held that a divorce de-
cree is not res judicata as to a child's paternity when the child was not a
party and not represented. 90 The decree had contained a finding the child
was not the child of the husband, although the child had been born during
the marriage. Subsequently the mother tried to establish that another man
was the father, but his paternity was excluded by blood tests. She then filed
a petition to establish paternity, but time passed and nothing happened, so
she then filed for a bill of review based on the fraud of the respondent. He
had alleged he was sterile. The court held that the bill of review was timely
filed because it was based on her earlier petition to establish paternity.9'
The Dallas Court of Appeals conditionally granted a writ of mandamus in
Baluch v. O'Donnell.92 In O'Donnell the father had initiated a voluntary
legitimation proceeding to obtain custody of his three-year-old son and the
mother filed a divorce petition. For two years there had been numerous
motions and hearings and the respondent ordered the father to pay interim
attorneys' fees. The father failed to do so, and the respondent granted a
motion for sanctions and issued an order striking all the father's pleadings.
The father asked for relief both as to the attorney's fees and the pleadings.
The court granted relief as to the pleadings by finding that striking them was
an abuse of discretion, but went on to hold that the father had an adequate
remedy as to attorney's fees on appeal. 93 The father's troubles were not
over, however, since after the case was transferred to another district court,
that judge as a condition of setting a trial date ordered him to pay the in-
terim attorney's fees. He again asked for a writ of mandamus which was
conditionally granted.94 The appellate court held that the failure to set a
trial date was a denial of due process under the Texas Constitution. 95 More-
over, since there is no specific authority for a trial judge to stay the proceed-
ings under these circumstances, the judge had exceeded her authority. 96
87. Garcia ex rel. Rodriguez v. Sullivan, 883 F.2d 18, 20 (5th Cir. 1989).
88. Garcia ex rel. Garcia v Sullivan, 874 F.2d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir. 1989).
89. 773 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
90. Id. at 648.
91. Id.
92. 763 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
93. Id. at 11.
94. Baluch v. Miller, 774 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
95. TEX. CONST. art. I §§ 13, 19.
96. 774 S.W.2d at 302.
[Vol. 44
PARENT AND CHILD
D. Injuries to Children
In Florio v. State 97 the conviction of a live-in boyfriend for injury to a
child by omission was reversed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in
light of Billingslea v. State 98 Billingslea had held that a person could not be
convicted of an injury by omission unless there is a statutory duty to act.99
While Billingslea involved injury to an elderly person (by a son against his
aged mother) and Forio involved an injury to a child, both convictions and
reversals were based on the same statute.1°° The Forio court noted that
while the facts in the case might have established a moral duty towards the
child these did not establish a parent-child relationship which would have
given rise to statutory duties. 101 In a footnote the court indicated that in the
future, under the amended statute, there might be authority for prosecution
of persons who act similarly to Billingslea and Florio.10 2 This case is distin-
guishable from Chapa v. State.10 3 In Chapa the Aunt who was convicted of
failing to protect the child had a legal duty towards the child, since she had
been named the managing conservator. 104
In another alleged abuse case, K F. by Faour v. Faour,105 the mother filed
a tort action against her former husband after the divorce decree had become
final, on behalf of her minor daughter seeking damages for the sexual abuse
that had occurred prior to the divorce. The divorce had been based on a
settlement agreement between the parties and did not mention the tort alle-
gations. The trial court granted summary judgment based on res judicata.
The appellate court reversed and remanded holding that the issue of sexual
abuse was not res judicata because the allegation had not been litigated and
was not essential to the divorce judgment.10 6
E. Discipline in-Education
In Cunningham v. Beavers 107 two children, one aged five and one aged six,
were disciplined at school by two swats with a wooden paddle that resulted
in bruises to both children. Their parents sued the superintendent of the
school district in federal court alleging a violation of constitutional rights.
The district court dismissed and the court of appeals affirmed.108 The court,
relying on Ingraham v. Wright 109 held that there were common law tort
remedies available to the plaintiffs and, thus, they were not denied due pro-
97. 784 S.W.2d 415 (rex. Cr. App. 1990, en banc.)
98. 780 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Cr. App. 1989).
99. It at 276.
100. Amended by 71st legislature 22.04 (a)-(K) (Vernon supp. 1990).
101. 784 S.W.2d 415, 17.
102. Id. note 2.
103. 747 S.W.2d 561 (rex. App.-Amarillo 1988, writ ref'd).
104. Id. at 563.
105. 762 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
106. Id. at 363.
107. 858 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 1343, 103 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1989).
108. Id. at 273.
109. 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (corporal punishment of school children was held not to be a
violation of their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment).
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cess. 0 The plaintiffs argued that research has shown that corporal punish-
ment is not the best method for disciplining or educating a child. The court
held, however, that because it was bound by precedent, this argument should
be addressed to the Texas Legislature.'' This case demonstrates that the
presence of a tort remedy in a stituation like this is a sham, since the money
damages would be slight. The children were not hospitalized and merely
missed a few days of school. The real damage may be that the children
might now have a negative attitude toward school which will result in poor
performance, and will limit their future career choices. This type of damage,
however, would be considered too speculative.
IV. CONSERVATORSHIP
A. Appointment of Conservatorship
In Beck v. Beck 11 2 a former wife petitioned for a bill of review alleging
that her absence from the trial was a significant factor in the appointing of
her ex-husband as managing conservator of their children. At the pre-trial
hearing it was conceded that she had a meritorious defense, but the trial
court ignored this and denied her relief.113 The court of appeals then af-
firmed based on the allegations that the wife had been negligent in not pursu-
ing remedies other than a bill of review.' 1 4 The Texas Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the only proper inquiry at a pre-trial hearing in a bill
of review should be on whether there is prima facie proof of a meritorious
defense. 115
In Shirley v. Montgomery' 16 a mother and father had been engaged in
long and expensive litigation over the custody of their child. The trial court
ordered the mother to pay $15,000 into the trust fund of the attorney ad
litem. She claimed she did not have the money. The trial court found that
the failure to pay the money prevented the attorney ad litem from finishing
his discovery as to the best interests of the child. The court ordered that it
would sanction the mother by striking her pleadings and not permitting her
to introduce evidence at trial unless she paid the $15,000 into the trust ac-
count. The mother then filed for a writ of mandamus asking that the sanc-
tions be set aside. The appellate court held that the mother did not have the
money to pay into the ad litem trust fund and that although she could, after
trial, appeal the judge's abuse of discretion, this was not an adequate rem-
edy. 117 The court pointed out that this was a child custody case and the best
interest of the child was the main issue.I1 Accordingly, it conditionally
110. 858 F.2d at 272.
1!1. Id. at 273.
112. 771 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. 1989).
113. Id. at 142.
114. Id. at 141.
115. Id.
116. 768 S.W.2d 430 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, mand. overr.).




granted the writ.' 19 The trial judge, apparently not satisfied by the ruling,
appealed the mandamus, but was overruled.120 The case is disturbing be-
cause of the expectations by the trial court that the grandparents, having
provided some funds to their daughter for her to pursue the case, have the
obligation to continue to subsidize the suit. There appears to be no consider-
ation of the fact that they are legal nonparties in this suit.121
In another mandamus case, Jasso v. Robertson,' 22 relief was denied be-
cause the father had standing and there was no violation of the mother's due
process rights. 123 The mother claimed that the child, whose custody was at
issue, was illegitimate, and therefore, the court did not have the power to
grant temporary managing conservatorship to the father because he was not
a parent.' 24 She had in her initial pleadings, however, admitted, although
she later denied it, that the parties were married and that the child was born
during the marriage. Even if the marriage is not proved, the father is prima
facie the father of the child if the mother admits that he is the biological
father of the child, his name is on the birth certificate, and he has signed an
affidavit swearing he is the father.' 25 Thus, the father in Jasso had standing
and the orders were not void.12 6 The court also held that there was no viola-
tion of due process because there had been three hearings and the mother
had ample opportunity to present any evidence she desired.' 27
B. Jurisdiction
Creavin v. Moloney128 was really a simple support case that was turned
into a custody jurisdiction dispute by mistake. The parents had married and
had a child in Ireland. They then moved to Pennsylvania and later the wife
and child returned to Ireland. The husband who remained behind, obtained
a divorce in Pennsylvania. The divorce decree made no mention of child
custody or support. The father then moved to Texas in 1984 and remained
there. The mother filed for a confirmation of her managing conservatorship
and for child support in Texas court. The father claimed that Texas courts
had no jurisdiction because of the Pennsylvania decree and the failure to
comply with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). 129 The
trial court dismissed the case claiming it had no jurisdiction. The appeals
court reversed, holding that a custody determination is not a prerequisite to
a suit for child support since both parents are obligated to support the
child. 130 There is also no requirement that a party comply with the UCCJA
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id at 433.
122. 771 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ).
123. Id. at 234.
124. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.01(3), 11.03(1) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
125. 771 S.W.2d at 234.
126. Id. at 233.
127. Id. at 234.
128. 773 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
129. Id. at 701. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.51 -.74 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
130. 773 S.W.2d at 703.
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when the court has personal jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the foreign
mother has come into the local court to ask for relief and the father defend-
ant resides within the jurisdiction. 131 The court held that the same reason-
ing applied as to custody jurisdiction and pointed out that there was no
showing by either party that any other state or country would be a more
appropriate forum. 132
C. Appellate Review
In three different cases appeals were denied because they were appeals
from the granting of a new trial; as such, it was an interlocutory decision and
not subject to appellate review. 133 In two of the cases, Wenske v. Wenske
and Scott v. Scott, the father had apparently obtained custody in the first
trial, with the retrial coming out differently. The fathers in neither case at-
tacked the final judgment. Instead, they claimed an abuse of discretion for
granting the new trial. Thus, in both cases the appellate court had to affirm
the judgment. 134 In the third case, Hurd v. Maxwell, the trial court had
granted a new trial only on the issue of possessory conservatorship and the
mother appealed because she wanted a new trial on the entire issue of con-
servatorship. The court held that there was no final judgment and dismissed
the appeal. 135
Fabian v. Fabian 136 was a case attacking the admission of evidence that
resulted in the father being awarded managing conservatorship. The mother
alleged that the evidence concerning her extra-marital affairs had been ob-
tained by the use of illegal wiretaps. The court found, however, that the
evidence was not obtained solely from wiretaps and admitted it. The appel-
late court reviewed the record as a whole and found that there was sufficient
evidence to warrant naming the father as managing conservator and so af-
firmed the judgment. 137 In Zetune v. Jafif-Zetune138 the court held that
awarding the mother managing conservatorship and the father possessory
conservatorship with frequent visitations did not deprive the father of his
First Amendment religious rights,139 since the trial court's decree did not
prevent the father from practicing his religion or from sharing his beliefs
with his children.14°
Two judgments providing for joint custody were attacked by appeal. In
In re Roach 141 the appeal was denied because the court ruled that the trial
131. Id. 702-703.
132. Id. 704-705.
133. Wenske v. Wenske, 776 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, no writ);
Scott v. Scott, 774 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, no writ); Hurd v. Maxwell, 762
S.W.2d 700, 701 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1988, no writ).
134. 776 S.W.2d at 781; 774 S.W.2d at 308.
135. 762 S.W.2d at 701.
136. 765 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, no writ).
137. Id. at 520.
138. 774 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
140. 774 S.W.2d at 390.
141. 773 S.W.2d 28 (rex. App.-Amarillo 1989, writ denied).
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court had the power to appoint both parents as managing conservators with-
out their prior written agreement. 142 The court held that it was the legisla-
ture's intent to permit trial courts to do this in cases pending at the time the
amendments to the Texas Family Code became effective. 143
In Wharton v. Gonzales I" the court held that the date the judgment be-
came final was the date the court, after a hearing and agreement by the
parties, entered in its docket "Orders per the record and the decree. ' 145 The
grandmother, who had agreed in court to being appointed joint managing
conservator, could not change the final judgment on the following day be-
cause she had changed her mind.'"
D. Intervention
In two cases, McCord v. Watts 147 and Lewelling v. Lewelling,14 8 grandpar-
ents intervened successfully in the original suit for divorce. In McCord the
wife and the paternal grandparents were appointed joint managing conserva-
tors. The wife contended that the paternal grandparents did not have stand-
ing, but the court held that while they might not have been able to initiate a
suit pertaining to conservatorship, they were entitled to intervene. 149 In Le-
welling the paternal grandparents were awarded managing conservatorship
and the mother appealed. She argued that awarding managing conservator-
ship to a non-parent was the same as a termination of parental rights and,
therefore, required clear and convincing evidence. The appellate court dis-
agreed, holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard was suffi-
cient, since the mother's rights were not terminated, she was named
possessory conservator, and could at a later date ask for a modification.150
E. Transfer or Dismissal of a Case
A court, once it has acquired jurisdiction in a suit affecting the parent-
child relationship, has continuing jurisdiction unless the children have been
residing in a different county for six months. 51 At that time the court upon
a proper motion must transfer the case to the court in the other county. 152
If there is no showing that the children have resided anywhere other than in
the county of the court having continuing jurisdiction, then the transfer is
142. Id. at 33.
143. Id. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
144. 761 S.W.2d 72 ('rex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
145. Id. at 74.
146. Id.
147. 777 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, no writ).
148. 774 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1989, writ granted).
149. 777 S.W.2d at 811. In Mitchell v. Balew, 765 S.W.2d 532, 533 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 1989, no writ), the court held that an ex-stepfather has no standing to initiate a suit for
managing or possessory conservtorship, absent exigent circumstances, but that he would have
had standing to intervene in a pending action.
150. 774 S.W.2d at 804.
151. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.06(b) (Vernon 1986).
152. Id.
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not mandated 15 3 A court is not mandated to transfer a suit unless it has
jurisdiction, and when a special appearance is filed- contesting jurisdiction,
that should be dealt with first; only then is the motion to transfer
germane.15 4
A conservatorship modification application by a mother can be dismissed
when she refuses to submit to drug testing, since drug usage would be a
material issue in the case. 155 In a suit affecting the parent-child relationship
an order requiring the parties to submit to psychological examinations by a
psychologist rather than a psychiatrist is merely voidable and, thus, manda-
mus is not a proper remedy.156 The court also held that the examination did
not violate the provisions of the Medical Practice Act regarding confidential
and privileged communications between doctor and patient. 157
F. Jury Trial
In Martin v. Martin 15 8 the Texas Supreme Court held that it is not revers-
ible error for a court to deny a jury trial in a suit to modify conservator-
ship.- 59 The mother was granted managing conservatorship, and was
required to establish her residence with the children in one of three specified
counties.' 60 After her remarriage she filed a motion to modify to permit her
to move with the children to a fourth county which was where her new
husband resided. When she asked for a hearing on the nonjury docket, her
former husband responded and moved for a jury trial. The trial court denied
the request for the jury trial, heard the case on the merits, and granted the
mother her motion for modification. The supreme court in affirming, rea-
soned that while a party is entitled to a jury trial, the findings of the jury on
matters concerning terms and conditions of access to the child are merely
advisory and may be contravened by the court. 161 Since the court determines
the conditions of access it is not error to deny a jury trial in a case in which
that is the only issue.162
153. Green v. Hassell, 764 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1989, no writ).
154. Mouso v. Alwortb, 777 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ). Fur-
thermore, the parent-child relationship may not be modified in a default judgment when there
is evidence in the record that there was no default and the alleged defaulting party had not
been given notice of the trial setting. Barnes v. Barnes, 775 S.W.2d 430, 431 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ).
155. Monaghan v. Crawford, 763 S.W.2d 955, 959 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no
writ).
156. Mackey v. Vick, 771 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
157. 771 SW.2d at 740; TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b (Vernon Supp. 1990).
158. 776 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1989).
159. Id. at 575.
160. Id. at 573.
161. Id. at 575.
162. Id. at 574. Since it is unlikely that a jury would have denied a mother the right to
move from one county to another in Texas, the father's request was probably merely for pur-
poses of delay or harassment.
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G. Modification of Conservatorship
In S.A.B.S. v. 163 the mother filed a motion to modify conservatorship
and the father counterclaimed asking for child support. The court reduced
her access and the appellate court held that this should not have been done
since there was no pleading to support this modification. 164 The trial court
had also ordered the mother to pay child support, although there had been
no original order to that effect, and there was no showing of a change of
circumstance. The appellate court also reversed this part of the judgment. 165
In Leighton v. Court 166 the managing conservatorship was changed from
the mother to the father after the child had been voluntarily relinquished by
the mother to the father's custody for more than twelve months. The court
held that the three weeks each summer that the original decree required
visitation rights for the father could be included in figuring the twelve
months.167
In Hawkins v. Haley 168 it was not an abuse of discretion for a court to
reduce the amount of visitation rights of the child's paternal grandparents
after it was shown that the father had moved from his parents home. 169 This
was a substantial and material change in circumstance. 170
In another case involving grandparents, their access rights were termi-
nated. 17 ' They had allowed the father to visit with the child despite a court
order to the contrary. The appellate court held that although there must be
extreme grounds for denying parents access, that is not the standard for
grandparents and, thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 172
In Brown v. Dixon 173 a father was granted immediate possession of his
child after he brought a habeas corpus writ. The mother who had been the
managing conservator died, and her parents sought to be named managing
conservator. The court held that the sole surviving parent is entitled to im-
mediate possession of the child where there are no existing orders governing
the right to possession of the child and where there is no question as to the
child's welfare. 174
Habeas corpus was also granted In Ex parte Aguilera, 17 a case in which
the mother was found in contempt for violating court orders by making de-
rogatory statements about the child's father in the child's presence. Fortu-
163. 767 S.W.2d 860 ('rex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
164. Id. at 861.
165. Id. at 862. The countersuit for support appears to have been a form of retaliation by
the father. He was earning $384 a week, while the mother was earning only $500 to $550 a
month. The trial court may also have wanted to punish the mother for asking for a modifica-
tion of custody since it ordered her to pay $150 per month in child support. Id.
166. 773 S.W.2d 63 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
167. Id. at 65.
168. 765 S.W.2d 914, 915 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
169. Id. at 914.
170. Id.
171. In re R.N.C., 768 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
172. Id. at 518.
173. 776 S.W.2d 599 (rex. App.-Tyler 1989, no writ).
174. Id. at 603.
175. 768 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, no writ).
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nately for the mother, the appellate court found that the derogatory
statements were made by a third party in the mother's presence, but not by
the mother. This was reluctantly held not to be a violation of the court
order. 176
H. Costs
A district court may order the county to pay the costs and expenses in a
suit affecting the parent child-relationship when it is for the protection of a
child and there is a finding of indigency on the part of the parents or other
parties. 177 It is not necessary that the county child welfare unit be named
managing conservator before such an order can issue.178 This was the opin-
ion of the Attorney General in response to a question from the Dallas
County District Attorney.1 79
V. SUPPORT
A. Guidelines
Child support guidelines became effective February 4, 1987 by order of the
Supreme Court of Texas, 180 and the courts have just begun to grapple with
the problems caused by a failure to understand or to follow them. In Euston
v. Euston 18 1 the trial court set the level of child support at twenty percent of
the husband's net resources, but failed to set a fixed dollar amount. The
twenty percent is within the supreme court's guidelines, but is not specific.
The decree failed to take into account both parents' future ability to pay.
The decree was held to be "vague, indefinite, and unenforceable." 18 2 In Ar-
chambault v. Archambault 18 3 the trial court did not follow the guidelines in
setting child support, nor did it make findings explaining why it failed to do
so. The appellate court held this was not error because the trial judge has
broad discretion and the appellant had not asked for findings. 184
In Bazan v. Bazan 85 the trial court deviated from the guidelines without
making findings, although a request had been timely filed. The appellate
court affirmed, leaning over backwards to support the trial judge, holding
that the request for findings had not been filed correctly and there was some
evidence to support the deviation.' 8 6 On the other hand, in Morris v. Mor-
ris,8 7 the appellate court reversed, holding that upon a timely request it is
176. Id. at 426.
177. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-1045 (1989).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See supra note 18. Essentially the same guidelines have been incorporated into the
Family Code. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.055(b) (Vernon Sup. 1990).
181. 759 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, no writ).
182. Id at 790.
183. 763 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ).
184. Id. at 52.
185. 762 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
186. Id. at 359-60.
187. 757 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
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mandatory that the trial court state its findings and the reasons for deviating
from the guidelines. 188 If the guidelines are to be of any use in making uni-
form the amount of child support paid for children throughout the state, it is
essential that the appellate courts require the trial courts to follow the stat-
ute, as the court did in Morrs.
B. Increase of Support
In two cases that were affirmed, Cams v. Cams 189 and Crume v. Crume 190
the trial courts increased the amount of support by ordering the obligors to
pay the medical expenses of their children. In Cams the obligor was ordered
to reimburse the obligee for the health insurance premiums she had paid for
the children's benefit.19' In Crume the obligor was required to pay half the
uninsured medical expenses of the child. 192 In Waltz v. Waltz,193 however,
the court reversed and remanded a money judgment for the wife, holding
that without an expert witness, it is not possible to determine if the medical
expenses which were necessary were also reasonable.' 94 In Satterfield v.
Hoff 195 the court granted a motion for summary judgment and ordered in-
creased child support and the reimbursement of certain dental expenses.
The court did not order the full amount of the increase in child support
requested, nor did it award attorney's fees. While all of these items had been
the subject of deemed admissions, the appellate court held that the trial
court was not bound to follow them in a child support case, since the matters
were all within the court's discretion.1 96
In Rocha v. Villarreal197 the court held that it was not an abuse of discre-
tion to substantially increase the amount of child support (the obligor not
being responsible for the children's medical insurance or medical bills) and
to make the increase retroactive to the date of the motion to modify. 198 It
was, however, improper to reduce the retroactive amount to judgment with-
out any notice to the obligor. 199 In another case, Anderson v. Anderson 20 a
former husband brought suit to lower his child support payments and his
former wife counterclaimed for an increase, which was granted. The appel-
late court affirmed, finding that there had been a change of circumstances in
188. Id. at 467.
189. 776 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1989, no writ).
190. 768 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
191. 776 S.W.2d at 604.
192. 768 S.W.2d at 15. However, the case was reformed on the issue of ordering wage
withholding. Since the trial court had sua sponte ordered the wage withholding this was an
abuse of discretion. Id. at 15.
193. 776 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1989, no writ).
194. Id. at 322.
195. 768 S.W.2d 839 (rex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied).
196. Id. at 841.
197. 766 S.W.2d 895, (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
198. Id. at 898-99.
199. Id. at 899. The amount of increase of child support was from $100 per month per
child to $350 per month per child. The obligee had to take personal bankruptcy, while the
obligor had an annual income of approximately $60,000.00. Id. at 898.
200. 770 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
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that the child's needs had increased, while the former wife's income had
decreased. 201 Although the former husband alleged that the increase in sup-
port payments would force him into bankruptcy, this was not relevant to the
best interests of the child. 20 2
C. Reduction in Support
In Anderson v. Anderson203 the ex-husband filed a motion to modify in
order to reduce his child support obligations. The appellate court affirmed
the trial court's denial, holding that the trial court was justified in including
unvalued property in the ex-husband's net resources and in finding that he
had transferred funds in order to reduce his net resources.204 In Comeaux v.
Comeaux, 20 5 however, the appellate court reversed the trial court, holding
that, in the interests of justice, a change in managing conservatorship ended
the support obligation under the agreement incident to the divorce.20 6 There
was a dissent based on the contention that the agreement was a non-modifia-
ble contract.207
In Marichal v. Marichal208 the court found that while the support amount
was specified, there was no language in the original decree ordering the obli-
gor to pay the child support award. 209 Accordingly, the amount in arrears
could not be reduced to judgment; however, the obligor's motion to modify
downward the amount of support payments could be made retroactive to the
date the motion to modify was filed.210 In Blanco v. Garcia2 11 the court held
that when there is sufficient evidence concerning a reduction in income, the
court is acting within its discretion when it reduces the amount of the child
support obligation.212
D. Modification of Support
In Klaver v. Klaver213 the appellate court affirmed that the trial court had
jurisdiction to hear a modification request that had been filed prior to the
child's eighteenth birthday.214 The mother requested that child support be
continued until the child graduated from high school.215 The request was
granted, the order was signed after the child became eighteen, and the sup-
port obligation was to continue until high school graduation. It was made
201. Id. at 95.
202. Id. at 96.
203. 767 S.W.2d 163 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
204. Id. at 165.
205. 767 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ).
206. Id. at 503.
207. Id. at 504.
208. 768 S.W.2d 383 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
209. Id. at 384.
210. Id. at 386.
211. 767 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
212. Id. at 898.
213. 764 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
214. Id. at 404.
215. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
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retroactive to the child's eighteenth birthday.216 In another case the court
was held to have jurisdiction to order the obligor to pay, by lump sum, half
of the medical expenses incurred prior to the child's turning eighteen.217 In
this case the motion for modification had been filed before the child's eight-
eenth birthday, although the hearing had not been held until several years
later.218 In Harkins v. State ex rel. Mason,219 however, an order for support
was held to be void because even though the child was disabled before she
was eighteen, the motion to modify support had been fied after the child had
turned eighteen.220 It may now be possible for the mother, although not the
state, to obtain some relief under the new legislation pertaining to support of
adult disabled children. 221
Sanctions posed problems for the trial court in Pinkley v. Vega 222 in which
the mother had moved to modify child support and conservatorship and her
motion was heard by a master with the father not taking part in the hearing.
The findings of the master were approved by the judge and an order was
entered. Then the mother moved for a new trial, which was granted and a
date was set for a hearing. At the hearing the father was ordered to have
certain financial information prepared for the next hearing. At that hearing
the father was the first witness, and upon discovering that the father was
unprepared, the court terminated the hearing and as a sanction reinstated
the original decree. The appellate court reversed, holding that since a new
trial had been granted, thus wiping out the first trial, another judgment
could not be entered without a trial.223 The question was whether or not
the original findings of the master were facts which could be carried through
from the first order, after it was vacated by the granting of a new trial, to the
second order which was entered after the aborted trial. The court of appeals
held that they could not.224
When a child is voluntarily relinquished by the managing conservator to
the possessory conservator for periods in excess of the court ordered periods
of possession, the money actually expended during that time may be used to
offset a support arrearage, but the offset may not be used for obligations
incurred but not paid.225 After proper notice, a child support arrearage may
be reduced to judgment, but the judgment may not include amounts unpaid
for more than ten years prior to the filing of the motion to reduce the arrear-
ages to judgment. 226 A court continues to have jurisdiction to enter judg-
ments on motions for payment of child support arrearages for four years
216. 764 S.W.2d at 404-405.
217. Sheldon v. Marshall, 768 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
218. Id. at 853.
219. 773 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
220. Id. at 404.
221. T x. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051 (Vernon Supp. 1990); see supra notes 270-16 and
accompanying text.
222. 768 S.W.2d 473 (rex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ granted). For a discussion of other
cases involving excessive sanctions, see supra notes at 86-88, 104.
223. 768 S.W.2d at 475.
224. Id.
225. Arnold v. Pitts, 777 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ).
226. Jordan v. Middleton, 762 S.W.2d 339, 342 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
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after the parent-child relationship has been terminated.2 27 The fact that the
obligor has been absent from the state for part of those two years does not
toll the statute, since this is not a statute of limitations, but one concerning
continuing jurisdiction.228
E. Indigent Obligors and Criminal Non-Support
An indigent obligor who is unrepresented may not be incarcerated on con-
tempt charges for failure to pay child support unless he has knowingly
waived his right to counsel.229 The fact that an obligor may need a court
ordered attorney does not prove that he is unable to discharge his support
obligation.2 0 A committment order will be considered void and habeas
corpus will lie unless the contempt order is specific as to the amount of ar-
rearages, the method of calculation of the arrearages, or the number of fail-
ures to pay the support.231 Ambiguity in other parts of an order will not,
however, excuse a support obligation. 232 When the obligor proves that he is
involuntarily incapable of paying the support obligation, he should not be
found in contempt.233 If, however, the obligor fails to prove indigency, then
committment is proper.234 A contempt order against the alleged husband
obligor is proper to enforce a temporary support order after prima facie
proof of a common-law marriage. 235
In Nunez v. Nunez236 a foreign child support order was enforced against a
Texas resident. The support order was based on an Illinois divorce decree in
which the father was ordered to pay child support. He had fallen behind in
his payments, and the children's mother asked the Texas court to enforce the
judgment. The father argued that the matter was uncertain because one of
the children was over eighteen, but the court held that Texas law permits
confirmation of a foreign judgement despite the child's age.3 7 The court
also pointed out that the judgment was entitled to full faith and credit since
under Illinois' Uniform Reciprical Enforcement of Support Act (UREA)238
227. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.41(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
228. In re C.L.C, 760 S.W.2d 790, 792 (rex. App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ).
229. Ex parte Gunther, 758 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. 1988); Ex parte Martinez, 775 S.W.2d 455,
456 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
230. Ex parte Chennault, 776 S.W.2d 703, 704 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).
231. Ex parte Reynolds, 776 S.W.2d 757, 758 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ);
Ex parte Higginbotham, 768 S.W.2d 4, 5 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ); Ex parte
Boykins, 764 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ; Ex Parte
Bahmani, 760 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
232. Mendez v. Attorney Gen. of Texas, 761 S.W.2d 519, 521-22 (rex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1988, no writ).
233. Ex pane Peters, 770 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1989, no writ).
234. Ex. parte Mulkey, 776 S.W.2d 308, 311 (rex. App.-Houston [1st. Dist.] 1989, no
writ); Ex parte Culver, 760 S.W.2d 794, 795 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ).
235. Ex parte Ortega, 759 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1988, no
writ). An attorney appointed to represent an indigent in a contempt hearing for failure to pay
child support is entitled to compensation not only for the original hearing, but also for pursu-
ing habeas corpus relief for the indigent. Cudd v. Bass, 771 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Tex. App. - Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ).
236. 771 S.W.2d 7 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
237. Id. at 9.
238. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1209 (1979).
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child support arrearages are a vested right and are specifically enforcea-
ble.239 In another URESA case,24° the father, who had been ordered by a
Nebraska court to pay child support but who had not made any payments
contended that there was no arrearage because the mother had agreed to
accept the parties' business in lieu of child support. The trial court agreed
and entered a take-nothing judgment. The mother, on appeal, contended
that there was insufficient evidence to support the judgment. The appellate
court reversed and rendered, not on the basis of the evidence, but as a matter
of law.241 The court held that the arrearage did exist because child support
obligations cannot be modified in either Texas or Nebraska by private agree-
ment of the parties.242 The only method for modification is by filing a mo-
tion for modification in the proper court, and this had not been done.243
State v. Paiz244 was a case of first impression in that the father was
charged with criminal nonsupport, although he had never been a resident of
Texas and had never been the subject of a Texas court order. He was ar-
rested in Colorado and extradited to Texas because his minor child,
although born in Colorado, was a resident of Texas and the father had never
contributed to her support. The father argued that since he had never been
in Texas, until he was arrested and extradited, he had never committed a
crime in Texas and, thus, the court had no jurisdiction. The court held that
the more modem legal trend is to invoke jurisdiction not based on where the
father resides, but where the child resides. 245 The court reasoned that the
harm occurs where the child resides and, thus, the crime is punishable in
Texas.2 " If this case is sustained it could pressage more draconian measures
to enforce child support than has been the rule in the past.
VI. TERMINATION AND ADOPTION
When a father fails to support his children in accordance with his ability,
his parent-child relationship may be terminated, but only if it is also in the
best interest of the child that the relationship be terminated. 247 The evi-
dence favoring termination must be clear and convincing.248 In Anthony v.
Mays249 the mother, who had remarried, sought to terminate the father's
parent-child relationship because he had failed to pay child support. There
was a jury trial, and the jury found that it was not in the child's best interest
to terminate his relationship with his father. The judge entered a judgment
non obstante verdicto terminating the relationship. An appeal was prose-
cuted by the guardian ad litem, and the appellate court reversed the trial
239. Id.
240. Rogers v. Griffin, 774 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 1989, no writ).
241. Id. at 707.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. 777 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989 (writ granted)).
245. Id. at 576.
246. Id. at 577.
247. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
248. Id. §§ 11.15(b),(c).
249. 777 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
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court, holding that the trial judge could not ignore the jury's findings when
they were supported by some evidence.250
The Department of Human Services most often acts to terminate the par-
ent-child relationship based on the grounds that the parents knowingly
placed the child in conditions that endangered the child, engaged in conduct
that endangered the child, or both.251 The Department must, of course, also
prove that termination is in the best interest of the child. 252 In In re D.E.253
the court held that there is no right to a two stage process in termination
trials.254 The first stage would be for the purpose of proving the alleged
misconduct and the second would be to determine the best interest of the
child.255 The court found this idea unworkable because the evidence for
proving conduct and best interest is either overlapping or the same.256
In four other termination cases the courts affirmed the trial courts' find-
ings of clear and convincing evidence. 257 A mother's effort to delay a termi-
nation proceeding by filing a motion to transfer, after she had filed for a
divorce in a different court, was prevented by the holding that her motion to
transfer was untimely.258 Normally a motion to transfer is mandatory, but
in this case the mother had, on the morning of the trial on the termination of
her parental rights, filed a motion for a nonsuit for her divorce in the termi-
nation court and after that had been granted, had refiled for divorce in an-
other district court in the same county. The appellate court found that
allowing such a maneuver would be to "acquiesce in a gross abuse of the
judicial system."'25 9 In Wheeler v. Baum 260 a mother was not able to appeal
the termination of her parental rights because she had not given the court
reporter notice of the filing of an affidavit of inability to pay costs. 261
In In re P.S.262 the appellate court reversed a termination of parental
rights, holding that there was not clear and convincing evidence to support
the jury's decision.263 The court agreed that the parents had not met the
250. Id. at 204.
251. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.02(1)(D), (E) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
252. Id. § 15.02(2).
253. 761 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
254. Id. at 601.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Sylvia M. v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 771 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1989, no writ) (the parent also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel because the same attor-
ney had also represented the appellant, the father and the maternal grandparents, but the court
found no actual conflict); In re L.R.M, 763 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ);
Jones v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 761 S.W.2d 103, 109 (Tex. App-Dallas 1988,
writ denied) (it was also held that the failure of DHS to provide services to reunite families is
not an issue in termination proceedings); In re A.C., 758 S.W.2d 390, 394 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1988, no writ) (the court also found that financial hardship was not the sole cause of the
parent's behavior).
258. Garza v. Texas Dept. of Human Sere. 757 S.W.2d 44,47-48 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1988, writ denied.
259. Id. at 48.
260. 764 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
261. Id. at 566.
262. 766 S.W.2d 833, 837-38 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1989, no writ).
263. Id. at 837-38.
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level of conduct specified by the Child Protective Services holding the failure
did not justify terminating their parental rights.264 In another case, the trial
court's termination of a mother's parental rights was reversed and remanded
because the jury instructions combined two independent grounds for termi-
nation into one, thereby making it possible for less than a majority of the
jury to have found against her on both issues.265 A child's alleged biological
father was able to contest the terminating of any interest he might have in
his child by submitting an answer alleging that he was an indigent parent
and asking for an indigency hearing and appointment of representation.
266
The trial court had ruled that the father had failed to respond by timely
filing an admission of paternity and terminated his interests in his child. The
appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the claim that the fa-
ther's allegation that he was an indigent parent was an admission of pater-
nity and, therefore, there should have been a hearing on his indigency, and
he should have been permitted to oppose the termination of his parental
rights.
2 67
A mother who had voluntarily relinquished her parental rights had no
vested right to bring a suit to adopt her child.268 The legislature by statute
has specifically denied standing to a parent whose rights have been termi-
nated to bring a suit for adoption unless the managing conservator has con-
sented. 269 The court found this does not violate equal protection because
there is a rational basis for the legislation since the best interests of the child
are paramount and in cases of termination of parental rights, permanency
and stability are most important to the security of the child.
270
264. Id. at 890.
265. E.B. v. Texas Dept. of Human Services, 766 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tex. App.-Austin
1989, writ granted).
266. Estes v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 773 S.W.2d 800 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989,
writ denied).
267. Id. at 802.
268. In re Hughes, 770 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1989, no writ).
269. TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. §§ 11.03(g)(1), (h)(2) (Vernon 1986).
270. 770 S.W.2d at 637-38.
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